WEBVTT

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Hi, I'm Isolde!

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Give an agent a real shell and it can leak a key

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or wreck a disk.

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This runtime moves the boundary below the agent.

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The idea.

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Put the boundary in the kernel, and keep the credentials somewhere the

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agent can never touch them.

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One control bounds the files.

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Try to open something outside the set, and the kernel hands back

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no file handle at all.

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The other blocks the dangerous system calls a workload never needs, and

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refuses to load any new kernel programs.

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The agent opens a connection.

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The kernel pauses that system call instead of failing it, and hands

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it to a listener outside the sandbox.

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That listener is the trusted supervisor, on the other side of the boundary.

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The agent's own connection never touches the network.

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The supervisor checks the request against the policy.

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No matching rule means no connection leaves the sandbox.

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If it is allowed, the supervisor adds the credential and dials out itself.

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The agent never holds the key.

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And before that policy can change, a prover checks the edit.

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A risky new rule waits for a human to approve it.

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The prover models files, network and process identity.

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Within those, it proves a policy stays inside a boundary.

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A rule it does not model comes back unsupported.

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You are told to treat that as a failure, not a pass.

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The hard part is making the no live where the agent cannot

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reach it, then saying how far it reaches.

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To recap.

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The kernel bounds files and system calls, credentials stay with the supervisor,

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and a prover gates every policy change.

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Every source is in the full article.

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I'm Isolde.

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Bye!
